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ABSTRACT: This article is devoted to the roots of the developments that have 
taken place in Ukraine since Autumn 2013 and up to the Russian invasion. It 
stresses the historical differences between Ukraine and Russia, presents the in-
ternational milieu of Ukrainian independence in the years 1991–2013, and ends 
with a description of the nature of the Maidan revolution and the pan-European 
challenge created by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The main thesis is 
that the struggle for Ukraine ends the post-Cold War epoch marked with an illu-
sion of eternal peace in Europe and with the groundless hope for Russian impe-
rialism to expire.
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Barbara W. Tuchman has described the end of the first Euro-
pean belle époque (1871–1914) in The Proud Tower: A Portrait of 
the World Before the War, 1890–1914 and The Guns of August.1 
The second European belle époque started in 1989 with the sec-
ond European “Spring of Peoples” that liberated the eastern part 
of the continent from the Soviet/Communist yoke and while being 
born was marked with an illusion of “the end of history” by Francis 
Fukuyama (Fukuyama, 1989: passim). It is, however, being termi-
nated now with the “Guns of August” the sound of which is being 
heard in eastern Ukraine. Thus, the title of the book by Tuchman 
fits well as a symbol of the end of both the belle époques – 1914 and 
2014. There is no simple analogy between 1914 and 2014. Even 
Today, Russia itself wants rather a revision of the post-Cold-War 
international order and the wars it is ready to fight are more a tool 
1 The Zimmerman Telegram completed the trilogy on the subject.
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to achieve that aim than the aim itself. The tool will be used if nec-
essary as Moscow still hopes rather to terrorize their neighbours 
and the West and to deprive them of their will to resist Kremlin’s 
expansionism than to confront the victims of such Russian policy 
openly and to defeat them on the battlefield. There is no military 
spirit among the European nations and their mood recalls the one 
that produced the appeasement policy of 1933–1939 and not the 
one that produced war in 1914. There is however a substantial 
difference between 1930s and today’s situation too. Then, the re-
visionist camp in Europe was composed of Germany, the USSR, 
and Italy and was supported by smaller states that lost in World 
War I (Hungary, Bulgaria) (Juhás, 1979: 356), and at least two 
non-state nations of the time: Ukrainians and Croats (Żurawski vel 
Grajewski, 2013: 99–107). There is only one fundamental revision-
ist power in Europe today – Russia. Germany and France do not 
want to return to the Cold War scale of the American domination 
in the continent, and therefore contest the US leadership on differ-
ent occasions and are very lenient with Russian aggressions, but 
still, one can hardly call them “revisionists.” Hungary still mourns 
their Trianon tragedy and one can speculate to what an extent its 
attitude towards Russian revisionism is shaped by that fact any 
continuing, active participation of Budapest in the reshaping of the 
political map of Europe according to the patterns it was following 
in 1938–1941 is highly improbable. On the other hand, the main 
pillar of the present European stabilization – the US military power 
and its prestige – had been absent from Europe before 1941 which 
is not the case today. The US, however, is challenged now by the 
rising problems in the Far East and Middle East, and its stabilizing 
impact on Europe may be negatively impacted by events in Iraq, 
Syria, Iran, or China (Shambaugh, 2014), or Korea, Taiwan and in 
the East China Sea (White, 2014) etc., or with some of those prob-
lems combined.2 The Malaysian aircraft shot down by Russians 
over Ukraine is not an equivalent to the Lusitania (Preston, 2003; 
Protasio, 2011: 200–201).3 It has turned the attention of Europe 
to the conflict in Donbas but it has not awoken the spirit of revenge. 
In spite of all those obvious differences there is one fundamental 
2 The Chinese threat is overestimated still its perception is a real factor in 
American policy planning. 
3 The ship sink by German U-boat on May 7th 1915 – the event contributed 
very much to convince the American public opinion for the US to enter the World 
War I. 
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similarity between the two belle époques in question – the existence 
of the illusion of the improbability of a serious war in Europe. This 
illusion was over in 1914 and is over now too. The monster of his-
tory is back on the scene.
There is however another historical analogy: this time the one 
between mental situation of Germany after 1918 and that of Rus-
sia after 1991. Russia lost the Cold War in a manner unconvincing 
to the man in the street just like Germany lost WWI. Do we see the 
“Weimar Russia” (van Herpen, 2013: 6, 8, 13–170) just being turned 
into the “Russian Third Reich”? The “humiliated power” that has no 
respect for the dignity of other nations and who believes in its own 
international position and power has been destroyed by “internal 
and external treason” and a plot, while its army had never been 
defeated in the field – is it a description of Germany in between the 
wars or Russia of today? The “treason of civilians” (Mikhail Gor-
bachev and Eduard Shevardnadze as the Russian equivalent for 
Philipp Scheidemann and Mathias Erzberger4) (Diest, Feuchtwanger, 
1996:186–207; Hunt, 1958: 355–371), a lot of Russian ethnic mi-
nority scattered all over the former Russian/Soviet Empire and the 
lack of consent to accept the fact that not necessarily all the ethnic 
Russians should live in the Russian State combined with the mysti-
cal semi racist ideology of ‘russkiy mir’ – “Russian world” inhabited 
by “Russian peoples” (Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians), re-
sembles strongly the Nazi myth on the Nordic-Teutonic community 
of the Germans and other Germanic peoples. There is a similarity 
between the European policy of appeasement both in the 1930s to-
wards the Third Reich and since 2008 towards Putin’s Russia.
Whatever the previous experiences of the border between the 
peace and the war in Europe are more similar to the current de-
velopments – those of 1914 or the ones of 1930s. – one thing is 
clear: the war in Ukraine having been started by Kremlin is a turn-
ing point in the European history – it ends an époque – one of the 
best Europe has ever had in her history. The odds for the future of 
the world seemed to be splendid at the beginning of the twentieth 
century – the most bloody one in the human history. They were the 
same at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Ukraine is not well-known in the West. The best book on the 
country and its people published in English in the last years (not by 
4 German politicians blamed for proclamation of Weimar Republic on Novem-
ber 9th 1918 (Scheidemann) and the acceptance of the Compiègne armistice on No-
vember 11th 1918 (Erzberger) – so called Dolchstoßlegende (stab-in-the-back myth).
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accident) has been entitled Ukrainians an Unexpected Nation (Wil-
son, 2009: 392; Żurawski vel Grajewski, 2013: 69–71). Thus, in or-
der to understand the importance of Ukraine, it is not enough just 
to present the ongoing developments at the banks of the Dnipro 
River.5 One should be aware of the history of the country which is 
neither “Southern-Western Russia” nor the “nest of Russian his-
tory” – at last not more than ancient Rome is a birth place of France 
or Spain. Zbigniew Brzeziński has described Ukraine as a pivotal 
state (Brzeziński, 1998: 41). Napoleon named Poland “a keystone 
of the European roof” – of course having said Poland he meant the 
only one that was imaginable in his times – i.e. the Polish-Lithua-
nian Commonwealth that means Poland together with Lithuania, 
Ukraine and Belarus. Those lands that are situated roughly speak-
ing between the Dvina and the Don Rivers in the East, the Oder 
River in the West, the Baltic Sea in the North, and the Black Sea 
and the Carpathian Mountains in the south.
No one in Europe remembers that the Russian army started its 
march to the West in 1792 by crossing the Dvina and the Dnipro 
Rivers to invade the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth just after 
the Constitution of May 3rd 1791 (the first in Europe and the sec-
ond one in the world after the American one) had been adopted 
in Warsaw(Butterwick, 2005: 695–731). In 1798 Suvorov’s army 
reached Switzerland and in 1814 the Russian troops entered Paris. 
Russia would have never done that without the French Revolution 
and the subsequent wars in Europe at the turn of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. The Europe of today is stable and peace-
ful. Who knows what will be tomorrow. Will Catalonia and Scot-
land declare independence? Will the Eurozone survive? Will the US 
maintain its capacity to guarantee the military security of the new 
NATO member states while being involved in the rising problems in 
the Middle East? What about the abovementioned problems of the 
Far East and the Washington engagement in Korea, Taiwan, Japan, 
Philippines, what about China? Will the Germans and the French 
be good Europeans like they used to be last 50 years ago? Does 
the West exists as a political entity that existed during the Cold 
War times? Are the “new” NATO and the EU member states treated 
by the “old” westerners as a part of that enlarged West (Kuźniar, 
2014)? The Newport NATO summit (3–4.09.2014) has proved it is 
5 All the Ukrainian toponyms in the text were spelled in a transcription from 
Ukrainian and not from Russian therefore Dnipro and not Dnieper, Kyiv and not 
Kiev etc.
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not necessarily the truth.6 Central Europe without NATO’s substan-
tial military infrastructure, and without numerous American troops 
on the spot, remains a second category grey zone of security. Who is 
deterred by the US bases in Germany and Italy? Are those countries 
threatened with any foreign military invasion? No one in Europe 
(except for Ukrainians) is ready to die for Donbas. Will anybody be 
ready to die for article 5 of the Washington Treaty if Putin’s “green 
men” appear in the Baltic States or Poland? These are the ques-
tions we ask ourselves over and over again here in Central-Eastern 
Europe. Ukraine fights for her freedom and integrity against the 
empire well-known to all the peoples in the region therefore it fights 
not only for her freedom still for our own too. What is Ukraine – the 
country that tries “To build a barrier…To slow down the giant, Who 
wishes to bring chains to the world?” (Delavigne, 1831).
The Country and its History
Ucraina est omens divisa in partes tres – one could start an 
essay on that country with that famous sentence travestied from 
De Bello Galico by Julius Caesar. It would be a far reaching sim-
plification however to see the country as divided into a Western 
part (Vohlynia, Eastern Galicia, Transcarpathian Ukraine, Northern 
Bucovina), a Central one (Eastword from the USSR western border 
of 1939 up till Chehryn line east-southwards from which the for-
mer “Wild Fields” – the steppes of the Black Sea started – the land 
that had remained uninhabited till mid-eighteenth century) and 
the Eastern-Southern part of the country (Donbas, Azov seaside 
and the Black Sea coast the areas that used to be the mentioned 
former steppes). The country is both divided and united simultane-
ously. Till the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the 
6 NATO has offered practically no material support for Ukraine (NATO leaders 
pledge support to Ukraine at Wales Summit, Web: 04 Sep. 2014 20:49, North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organisation, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112459.htm) 
and respected Russian zone of special interests in new NATO member states by 
refraining from the creation of any new serious military bases or facilities on their 
territory and by refusing the deployment of any standing substantial military forc-
es there. Wales Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, Press Release 
(2014) 120, Issued on 05 Sep. 2014, Web: 05 Sep. 2014 16:21, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.
htm?selectedLocale=en. 
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very name Ukraine (Ukraina – in Polish and Ukrainian means the 
end, an edge or a borderland) was a geographical and not an eth-
nic nor political term. It was used since the sixteenth century as 
a common name for the three former voivodships (districts) of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – Kyivian, Braclav, and Cherni-
hiv. Only at the dawn of the twentieth century the Ukrainian histo-
rian and then president of the parliament of the Ukrainian People’s 
Republic, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi, popularized the term Ukraine 
and Ukrainians (and not indigenous – Rus’ and Rusyns or based 
on Latin – Ruthenia and Ruthenians – having been used till then) 
as an ethnic and political one for all the lands of the Ukraine of 
today (Грушевський, 1913–1936).
Ukraine is in some sense like England with its 1000 years of 
history and the United States with its 200 years combined in one 
country. The “England” is that part of Ukraine that has been in-
habited since the Middle Ages, and which constituted the bulk of 
the populated lands since the beginning of the history of Kyivian 
Rus’ (or Kyivian Ruthenia)7 till the end of the seventeenth century. 
The “United States” is former “prairie” – the uninhabited steppes 
that started south east from the mentioned Chehryn and were lim-
ited from the south by the Black Sea and the Azov Sea while in the 
East they are divided by the Ukrainian border now still geographi-
cally they ended “nowhere” reaching in fact to the Pacific Ocean in 
Manchuria. Those opened lands and borders that could not be ef-
fectively guarded in the condition of the technical civilization prior 
to the late eighteenth century were the homeland of kozaks – orig-
inally the self-defense of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s 
borderland (the country that was invaded every spring by the Tatars 
from Crimea), and then a military structure being partly a kind of 
“pirates” of the steppes, and partly the irregular forces mobilized 
by the state in the case of war. That part of Ukraine was lost by 
Poland in the years 1648–1686 still finally conquered and effectively 
controlled by Russia of Catherine II – Sofie Anhalt Zerbst not earlier 
but by 1775.
What is western and central Ukraine now (“England”) had been 
a center of Kyivian Rus’ and then with Kyiv itself become a part of 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or in minor parts went under 
7 The term Kievan Russia or Kievan Rus used in the western historiography 
has been adopted under the influence of the Russian imperial version of history 
according to which the medieval state of the eastern Slavs with its capital in Kyiv 
(Russian Kiev) was the first “Russian” state. It is obviously false.
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Hungarian (Subcarpathian Rus’8) (Magocsi, 1978, passim) or Mol-
davian (Romanian) sovereignty (Northern Bucovina). The Crimean 
Peninsula was the center of the Tatar’s Khanate and like South Be-
sarabia – Budiak were both under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. 
This was all changed step-by-step since 1654 when Russia started 
to conquer those lands first from Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
then in the eighteenth century from Ottoman Empire and then in 
the years 1939–1945 from Poland, Romania, and Hungary/Czecho-
slovakia. As a result, the “prairie” was settled by Ukrainians only 
when having been already conquered by the Russian Empire – i. e., 
since the mid-eighteenth century and then additionally populated 
with many Russians especially as a result of the disaster of the 
Great Famine (1932–1933) that had “purified” the lands from mil-
lions of Ukrainian peasants (Dolot, 1985: 231; Мицик, 2003–2004: 
295, 441). The country was additionally ethnically reshaped as a re-
sult of a side effect of the Stalinist industrialization that attracted 
to those lands millions of workers from all over the USSR. The 
Great Famine, the Bolshevik terror, and the collectivization of the 
1920s and 1930s were the experience of the Central and Eastern 
Ukraine, while the Western part was saved from all that by virtue 
of not being a part of the USSR till 1939. The Western part of the 
country, Eastern Galicia, Transcarpathian Ukraine, and Northern 
Bukovina had never been under Russian rule until World War II, 
and had preserved its Central European character under Polish or 
Habsburg rule and a dominant Greek-Catholic population (unlike 
in Russian/Soviet part of the country with the orthodox denomina-
tion as the only legal one). Another western province of the coun-
try – Volhynia – was taken from Poland and annexed by Russia in 
1795, and since then forcefully Russified as all the other Ukrainian 
lands within the Russian Empire, so it is dominated by the Or-
thodox Church. Still its Western part belonged to Poland between 
1919 and 1939. Thus, it was not as deeply “Sovietized” as the ter-
ritories eastward from the pre-war Polish-Soviet border, and had no 
experience of Soviet genocide by starvation that was the fate of the 
territories to the east.
There is some separatism in Transcarpathian Ukraine inspired 
both from Moscow and from its Canadian and US based diaspora9 
8 Subcarpathian/Transcarpathian Ruthenia/Rus/Ukraine has 13 names 
given to it by the people and state possessors of the land.
9 The main western based center of that idea is concentrated around Paul 
Robert Magocsi – a well-known historian of the region. 
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(The Persistence of Regional Cultures …, 1993; Magocsi, 1993) Ca. 
200 thousands of ethnic Hungarians in the region constitutes the 
local border majority just at the frontier with Hungary. The Hun-
garians are quite numerous in the main cities of the province too.10 
The consecutive Hungarian, Austro-Hungarian, and Czechoslovak 
political affiliation of the country, as well as the Greek Catholic 
denomination of the Ukrainian population and Roman Catholic or 
Calvinist one of the Hungarians places it in the western cultural 
space and Central European and not Russian political tradition.
Northern Bukovina first belonged to the Moldavian Principality 
– one of the two so called Danube Duchies (the other being Valac-
chia) that in the mid-nineteenth century united into the Romanian 
Kingdom. Prior to that they were the fiefdoms of the Ottoman Em-
pire. Less lucky Moldova as a result of the Turkish-Russian wars 
lost Bukovina for Habsburg Monarchy in 1775 and Bessarabia (the 
bulk of which is known as Moldavia of today) for Russia in 1812. 
Between the world wars both the provinces belonged to Romania 
(Żurawski vel Grajewski, 1995: 56–67; Balcerak, 1980: 3–15) and 
were taken from her in 1940 as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Rib-
bentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 and the military disaster of France 
in June 1940 that had reassured Stalin on the lack of any risk of 
such an action. Northern Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia were 
incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR and thus then inherited by the 
independent Ukraine (Kastory, 2002: 193–219).
Ukraine fought fiercely for her independence in the years 1918–
1921 against the “White” and the “Red” Russia, Poland, and Ro-
mania. The former “Russian Ukraine” – proclaimed the Ukrainians 
People’s Republic (22nd January 1918) with Kyiv as its center and 
fought its war for independence against Russian imperialism re-
gardless of its colors (“White” or “Red”) and finally allied with Po-
land in 1920. The former Habsburg province of Eastern Galicia 
proclaimed another Ukrainian state (Western Ukrainian People’s 
Republic) with Lviv as its center. The city of Lviv (Polish Lwów, 
Austrian – Lemberg, French – Leopolis) inhabited at that time by 
the Polish majority, rebelled however in a Polish national uprising 
against the newly created Ukrainian state, and thus started its war 
against the reconstituted Polish state (1st November 1918). The two 
10 The percentage of Hungarians in the main cities of the province according 
to 2001 census is: Uzhorod/Ungvár – 7.03 %, Mukachevo/Munkács – 9.64 %, Bere-
hovo/Beregszász – 55.87%. Distribution of the population by native language, Zakar-
patska oblast, (All Ukrainian Population Census, State Statistics Service of Ukraine).
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Ukrainian states confederated (22nd January 1919) and then broke 
up their union. For the Western Ukrainians Poland was the main 
enemy, for the eastern ones – Russia. Divided and attacked from 
all angles, the Ukrainians lost their war for independence in spite 
of the Polish efforts to build a Kyivian Ukraine as a bulwark against 
Russia. Thus, within the Versailles system, Ukrainians constituted 
the largest nation without its independent state in Europe and were 
pushed into the revisionist camp dissatisfied with the post-World 
War I European order. This resulted in the Western Ukrainian-
German collaboration before and during the war, and in a bloody 
action aiming at the extermination of the Polish civil population of 
Vohlynia and Eastern Galicia conducted by the Ukrainian guerrilla 
(UPA – Ukrainian Insurgent Army) in the years 1943–1944 – when 
those lands were being occupied by Germany (Siemaszko, Siemasz-
ko, 2000: passim).
Moscow traditionally tried to Russify the newly conquered re-
gions. It abolished the Greek Catholic Church and imprisoned its 
priests in the Gulag. The bitter guerrilla resistance lasted in the 
Western Ukraine till 1956 and won UPA the distinction of being 
heroic fighters for national freedom. The image of UPA still divides 
Poles and Ukrainians. For Poles, it was a criminal organization 
responsible for genocide of the men, women, and children in the 
south-east territories of occupied Poland, and for Ukrainians, it is 
an army of freedom fighters against the totalitarian USSR.
Stalin’s unification of Ukraine in the years 1939–1945 was 
based on the Soviet conquest and ethnic as well as on social-class-
struggle theory based purification (the annihilation of all poten-
tial class enemies of communism) of the new lands incorporated 
into the Ukrainian SRR. The victims of that action were both non-
Ukrainians (Poles, Czechs, Germans, Romanians) as well as non-
Soviet Ukrainian leaders and population. Massive killings, impris-
onments, and deportations shaped the Ukrainian SSR that enriched 
with “Khrushchev gift” of Crimea in 1954 (the Peninsula conquered 
by Russia in 1783 (Podhorodecki, 1987: 267–277), and finally eth-
nically purified by a Soviet-type – genocidal deportation of Crimean 
Tatars of May 18th 1944 (Chazbijewicz, Olsztyn: 97–110) survived 
till the end of the USSR. The independent Ukraine proclaimed in 
1991 came into being in the territorial shape resulted from history. 
Ethnic purifications of the World War II in the Western part of the 
country had annihilated the physical base for Polish-Ukrainian con-
flict that had been poisoning the relations between the two peoples 
since the late nineteenth century. The memory of the bloody past 
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still exists in Poland and in five out of 25 districts of Ukraine still 
the Poles and the Ukrainians no more share the same motherland, 
which used to be the case of the struggle prior to 1947 and thus 
the real reason for conflicts of 1918–1919 and 1939–1947 is over. 
Russia tries to play on the memory of them, as it does as far as the 
other historical animosities in the region are concerned, but still 
these are not the ghosts of history that shape contemporary Polish-
Ukrainian relations. Nevertheless, the Russian state tries to revive 
them hoping for the destruction of the regional co-operation and 
solidarity of the “limitroph” states threatened by Kremlin’s imperi-
alism.11 Taking that into consideration the reconciliation between 
Polish and Ukrainian elites and the fact that Poland was the first 
country in the world that recognized the independence of Ukraine 
in 1991 (Canada was the second one) and both the Maidans – the 
one of 2004 and that of 2013/2014 enjoyed a great popular sup-
port in Poland is one of the most important socio-psychological, 
and thus political, victories of both nations positively shaping the 
Polish-Ukrainian relations in spite of the bloody past.
11 Russian historical policy coordinated by Foreign Ministry and supervised 
by the president is concentrated on two main goals – glorification of Soviet/Rus-
sian participation in the second part of the World War II (while being rather silent 
on the period 1939–1941) and on the nourishing of the memory of the conflicts 
between Poles and Ukrainians, Poles and Lithuanians, Poles and Belarusians, 
Ukrainians and Romanians, Hungarians and Slovaks etc. There are special asso-
ciations, web sites and periodic issued or sponsored by Russian Federation deal-
ing with that task. For the examples of such Russian historical propaganda see: 
Фонд “Историческая память” http://historyfoundation.ru/index.php or Журнала 
российских и восточноевропейских исторических исследований, http://histud-
ies.ru/. For the examples of official state prepared materials see: Деятельность 
ОУН-УПА из документов НКВД-МГБ СССР рассекречено в 2008 году, 
Информационные материалы, Дипломатия России от посольсково приказа 
до наших дней Историко-документальный департамент МИД России, http://
www.idd.mid.ru/inf/inf_01.html or Комментарий к официальному материалу 
МИД ЛР, распространенному в Брюсселе в апреле 2009 г. среди стран-членов 
НАТО «О латышском добровольческом легионе СС», Историко-документальный 
департамент МИД России, 10-06-2009, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-arch.ns
f/932b471b7dc29104c32572ba00560533/941db813df91a9fec32575d1002b1ce
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Ukraine in Europe in the shadow of the EU’s 
“Russia first policy”
The belle époque started in 1991 with the collapse of the USSR. 
Poland soon associated with the European Communities and thus 
with the newly created EU soon.12 The other countries of the region 
did the same except for Belarus, who did not want to, and Ukraine 
and Moldova who tried but were still rejected by Berlin and Paris 
who did not want “to irritate,” “to humiliate,” or “to isolate” Russia 
(Bielecki, 2000:.A1-A5; Żurawski vel Grajewski, 2001: 179–214). 
Thus, in spite of the first pro-European offensive of the Ukrain-
ian diplomacy (1998–1999) led by Ukrainian foreign minister Borys 
Tarasiuk, the project of a European Ukraine failed as a result of 
the “Russia first” policy adopted by the EU, and as the outcome of 
the incompetence, corruption, and inertia of the Ukrainian state 
itself. Ukraine signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
with the EU and simultaneously resigned from its nuclear status in 
1994. The PCA was put into force in 1998 and was never fully im-
plemented.13 The EU-Ukraine debate was to a large extent dominat-
ed by the Chernobyl power station problem till 2000 when the facil-
ity was finally closed under EU pressure (Monitoring Foreign and 
Security Policy of Ukraine, March 1999: 38–39). No more Ukrainian 
problems have ever seriously occupied the minds of the European 
politicians except for the Poles till 2004.
The “big bang” of the European Union enlargement of 2004 
was combined with the second wave of the NATO enlargement 
and with a profound breakdown within NATO and inside the EU 
caused by the American-led war in Iraq (since 2003). Three out 
of four strategic political goals of Poland had been achieved: lib-
eration from Soviet/Russian domination, NATO membership, and 
EU membership. Only the political westernization of the Eastern 
12 Układ europejski ustanawiający stowarzyszenie między Rzecząpospolitą 
Polską, z jednej strony, a Wspólnotami Europejskimi i ich Państwami Członkowskimi, 
z drugiej strony, sporządzony w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r., (Dz. U. z dnia 
27 stycznia 1994 r.), p.1–169.
13 98/149/EC, ECSC, Euratom: Council and Commission Decision of 26 Janu-
ary 1998 on the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between 
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, 
of the other part, EUROPA, EU law and publications, EUR-Lex – 31998D0149 – 
EN, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/;ELX_SESSIONID=LTL5JP
vDytYkyYKh91QyFj1VftTzJhXLcvyzTCcxcgWpJJHw86gJ!-701004031?uri=CELE
X:31998D0149.
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Polish neighbourhood  remained as the only one to be accom-
plished. On the other hand, in spite of some differences beneath 
of the strategic level, the near-unanimous support Poland had en-
joyed from her western partners in the previous decade was over. 
The strategic community of Polish and German interest expired. 
It was Germany, not Poland that had changed its traditional pro-
American foreign and security policy having been conducted till 
2003 since Konrad Adenauer times. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
proclaimed his Deutsche Sonderweg (German special way) pol-
icy (Adamski, 2005) oriented towards Russia, and aimed at the 
reduction of the US domination in the security structure of Eu-
rope (Malinowski, 2009: 363–390; Miszczak, 2012: 229–245 and 
306–341). This could not be supported by any responsible Polish 
government.
The reform of the voting system in the EU Council (first pro-
posed in the Constitutional Treaty for the European Union) pro-
voked next clash between Poland and the leading European powers, 
thus deepening the division produced by Polish (Central Europe-
an) support for American-led war in Iraq. Polish activity in Europe 
based on the accession process had been over and the new one had 
been blocked by the two conflicts with Berlin and Paris mentioned 
above. In such a situation the Orange Revolution and the Polish 
support for it brought Poland back into the game. It was the Pol-
ish and Lithuanian presidents’ efforts that brought Javier Solana 
to Kyiv. The real importance of that fact was limited still the impres-
sion in Poland and in Europe was significant – Poland led the EU 
Ukrainian policy for a while. The EU reacted poorly, however, and 
the “Orange” camp compromised itself in the few years following 
the Maidan of 2004.
Nevertheless, Poland tried to attract the EU and NATO atten-
tion to its eastern neighbors, and particularly to Ukraine. NATO 
seemed to be a less complicated structure to be addressed, how-
ever, Kyiv membership in it was politically more difficult to be pro-
moted as a goal of Ukrainian foreign and security policy both due 
to the post-Soviet mentality of a large part of especially eastern 
Ukrainians, and secondly due to the bitter opposition of Russia the 
West did not want to annoy (Ukraina bliżej Zachodu, 2005). The 
first attempt was made as early as 1995 when Poland and Ukraine 
created a common peace battalion then used in former Yugoslavia 
(Grygolec, no 6: 78; Krząstek, 2002: 284–303; Malendowski, 1998: 
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158–163).14 After 2004, when Spain had withdrawn her troops, the 
Ukrainian contingent constituted the second largest force in Polish 
leaded multinational division Center in Iraq. This however was ter-
minated soon by the withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops that had 
been promised to Maidan by then newly elected president Victor 
Yushchenko (Kolasiński, 2008: 255–292). The climax of pro-NATO 
Ukrainian offensive took place in April 2008 NATO summit in Bu-
charest and ended with failure. In spite of Polish, Lithuanian, and 
Romanian support, the US confronted with Franco-German oppo-
sition proved not to be able to push the Membership Action Plan 
for Ukraine (and Georgia). The decision was postponed until the 
December summit and the postponement once publicly declared 
triggered Russian invasion on Georgia that has ruined the entire 
project (Asmus, 2010: 187–240).
As far as the EU dimension was concerned, Warsaw tried to fi-
nalize her first large eastern initiative (the EU Eastern Dimension) 
at the turn of 2002 and 2003 when Poland had still been merely 
a candidate country to the EU and the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP) was just being born (Żurawski vel Grajewski, 2004: 
67–89). The Polish initiative failed, however, mainly due to the 
Mediterranean lobby opposition. The second Polish (and Swedish) 
project was launched in 2008–2009 in a context of the Russian 
aggression on Georgia. The initiative is known as the Eastern Part-
nership (EaP).
The announcement of the creation of the Union for the Mediter-
ranean by the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy on 13th August 
2008 (Barcelona Process, 2008:1–13) created a good climate for the 
regionalization of European Neighborhood Policy – and the Russo-
Georgian war create a demand for the EU “to do something” for its 
eastern neighbors. The negative goals that motivated the main play-
ers, however, hidden deeply in the diplomatic rhetoric, determined 
the shape of the initiative. The Polish-Swedish action could have 
relied on German support since Berlin was interested in slowing 
down French ambitions that were based on drawing attention and 
attempting to direct the majority of EU funds to the Mediterranean 
basin – i.e., to the areas outside of the German scope. German 
14 For more information consult: Drive to set up Joint Battalions or New De-
fense Cooperation Philosophy, CACDS, http://www.niss.gov.ua/mac/cacds/ar-
chivee/Jan/0122d.html and POLUKRBAT, Jednostki wojskowe, Wojsko Polskie, 
http://www.jednostki-wojskowe.pl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&
id=360&Itemid=26.
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support for the Eastern Partnership initiatives had therefore more 
instrumental than strategic meaning. It was a will to build a coun-
terbalance to the French initiative to limit it, yet not for the real 
intention to open the EU towards the East that motivated Germany. 
The other “big actors” had no interest in the project whatsoever. 
When the EaP was accepted at the first EU-EaP countries summit 
in Prague (7 May 2009), the president of France, along with the 
prime ministers of Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, were absent at 
the meeting. The only top-level representative of a large EU member 
state was German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The biggest concern 
of the German representatives, supported by the Dutch, was that 
the invited neighboring countries were not called “European part-
ners” (this could have been interpreted as approving their ambitions 
concerning future membership in the EU) but as the Eastern-Eu-
ropean partners. Additionally, this happened according to German 
preferences.15 The summit in Warsaw (29th–30th September 2011) 
ended up with failure. No one of the partner countries had sup-
ported the Polish prepared declaration on Belarus that boycotted 
the meeting (Kłysiński, 2011), and as far as the western leaders 
are concerned the absence of the French president as well as the 
prime ministers of Britain and Italy seemed to become traditional 
(Szymaniak, 2011).16 The Eastern Partnership poorly financed and 
politically neglected by the leading EU powers seemed to die at the 
end of 2011 with the EU attention overwhelmingly attracted by the 
eurozone crisis (Żurawski vel Grajewski, 2012) and the Arab revo-
lutions. That situation lasted till mid-2013 when Russian pressure 
on EaP partners country combined with unexpected and unwilling 
cold relations between Berlin and Moscow, caused by the Cyprus 
bank system crisis that painfully hit Russian oligarchs, revived the 
initiative.
15 Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit Prague, 7 May 
2009, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 7 May 2009, 8435/09 (Presse 
78), p.5. See as well: Niemcy a Partnerstwo Wschodnie, “Best OSW”, nr 18(93), 
13.05.2009, p.12. For more about the Eastern Partnership see: The Eastern Partner-
ship in the Context of the European Neighborhood Policy and V4 Agenda, ed. by I Al-
brycht, Kraków 2010, pp.64. http://www.europeum.org/doc/publications/enp.pdf.
16 See as well: Na szczycie Partnerstwa Wschodniego Merkel i Barroso; 
zabraknie Sarkozy’ego, Wiadomości, “Gazeta Prawna”, 28 września 2011, http://
www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/artykuly/551415,na_szczycie_partnerst-
wa_wschodniego_merkel_i_barroso_zabraknie_sarkozy_ego.html. and: Szwedzki 
MSZ: Efekt szczytu Partnerstwa Wschodniego “gorszy niż oczekiwano”, EurActiv.
pl, 4.10.2011, http://www.euractiv.pl/prezydencja/artykul/szwedzki-msz-efekt-
szczytu-partnerstwa-wschodniego-gorszy-ni-oczekiwano-002984.
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Russia had just humiliated the US in Syria which boost Krem-
lin’s imperial mood that combined with an image of the decadent 
West – the EU confused with the eurozone financial crisis and the 
United States led by a weak president who is not able to enter any 
real confrontation – resulted in the next stage of the Moscow’s zone 
of influence policy, this time focused on the EaP countries that 
had just been offered a perspective on the EU association. The re-
spective decisions on association were expected to be taken at the 
upcoming Vilnius summit so Russian action started in the sum-
mer 2013 and aimed at preventing them. Armenia – surrounded 
by her traditional enemies – Azerbaijan and Turkey and looking 
for Russian protection, capitulated first, and withdrew from the 
negotiations with the EU.17 Belarus neither wanted nor had been 
invited to association talks as well as Azerbaijan (Ananicz, 2013). 
On the other hand, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine continued the 
negotiations with Brussels and soon faced Russian counteraction. 
Kremlin’s brutal pressure on Ukraine resulted in the withdraw-
al (21.11.2013) of president Victor Yanukovych from the already 
agreed the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement that was expected 
to be signed at the Vilnius EU-EaP summit. The decision triggered 
the second Maidan and thus the revolution.
The Vilnius summit (28th–29th November 2013) proved to be an 
exceptional one. Unlikely the previous summits in Prague and War-
saw this one was attended by all the leaders of the EU member 
countries. The association agreements with Georgia and Moldova 
were adopted, but still the one with Ukraine that had been already 
agreed upon earlier was not signed. Some minor agreements on visa 
regime liberalization (Azerbaijan) cheap airlines accession to the air 
space of the contracting parties (EU-Ukraine) and conflict regula-
tions (Georgia) were signed too. These were,  however, the solutions 
that soon were proved to belong to the epoch that is about to end. 
Governments and diplomats influence reality but it would be an il-
lusion to think they alone shape or control it. The rare still powerful 
actor entered the scene – the nation – this time it was the Ukrainian 
one and changed the situation.
17 The Presidents of Russia and Armenia, Władimir Putin i Serzh Sargsyan 
met in Novo Ogariovo near Moscow (3.09.2013) and announced the decision on the 
Armenian accession to the Custom Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and 
the will to create the Euroasiatic Economic Union. This was ipso facto the resigna-
tion of Armenia from the association with the EU. 
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“The Guns of August”
Protests started in Kyiv yet on 21st November with a student 
happening. While attacked by the riot police (30th November and 
10th–11th December 2013) they turned into mature protest against 
the corrupted, oligarchic system. Then the Ukrainians – confront-
ed with the set of new laws adopted by Verkhovna Rada (The Su-
preme Council – the Ukrainian Parliament) in an unconstitutional 
way (16th January 2014) – the laws directly “borrowed” from Rus-
sian “legislative acquis” – faced a dramatic choice – authoritarian 
dictatorship or revolution. They chose revolution. The first victims 
killed by the Yanukovych regime fell down in a symbolic place and 
on a symbolic day – in the Hrushevsky Street on 22nd January 
2014 – on the Ukrainian national holiday – the Unification Day (the 
anniversary of the union between the Western Ukrainian People’s 
Republic and the Ukrainian People’s Republic proclaimed in 1919, 
which is simultaneously a day of the proclamation of the independ-
ence by UPR in 1918. Myhaylo Hrushevskyi was the first president 
of the UPR’s parliament. The climax of the street fighting took place 
18th–20th February and took the life of some hundred victims. Still 
the revolution prevailed, Yanukovych escaped and the country po-
litically again turned to the West.
Russian policy planning towards Ukraine suffers from immi-
nent and incurable weakness. It is based on the Russian imperial 
myth, being promoted by a favorite Kremlin’s historical propagan-
dist Alexander Dugin (Matt, 2014; Motyl, 2013), of mental unity 
of the Russian world (russkiy mir) – i.e. Russian, Belarusians and 
Ukrainians and of its Euroasian and not European nature. In Pu-
tin’s imperial rhetoric they are all “one nation.” According to that 
ideology Russian policy planners and socio-technicians try to plan 
their operations being addressed to Ukrainians in a way they do it 
while addressing Russians – if Ukrainians and Russians are “in 
fact one nation” as president Putin said (Fisher, 2014), they should 
react in the same way. Russian policy makers apparently think 
the socio-political tricks successfully applied by Kremlin while 
dealing with Russians should be equally effective in dealing with 
Ukrainians. The problem is that Ukrainians are not Russians, but 
Moscow imperialists cannot accept that “revolutionary” idea, and 
consequently, are not able to predict the reactions of the men in 
the street in Kyiv, Odessa, Mariupol, Donetsk, and Luhansk. The 
Maidan revolution and its success “took the Kremlin by surprise.” 
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The expected pro-Russian massive uprising in Donbas and the so 
called Novorossiya (the former Black Sea steppes) never happened 
and the Ukrainian state has not collapsed. The informal aggression 
of the “green men” – so successfully conducted in Crimea while 
the Ukrainian state, and especially its armed forces, had been still 
in a post-revolutionary confusion, went pretty badly when Russia 
tried to repeat it in Donbas and Odessa. It failed completely in the 
south and could be survived only due to the growing military and 
material support from Russia in the east. Thus Putin and his silo-
viks (78% of the Russian higher officials are former KGB or GRU 
agents) started the risky game leading to war (Kisielewski, 2007: 
93). The annexation of Crimea covered the impression of defeat 
Russia had suffered as a result of the Maidan victory. It could be 
a good point for Putin to stop and consume the glory of a winner. 
Still “the appetite grows with eating”. The temptation was too big 
to resign from further steps. Thus the operation in the East start-
ed yet the Crimean model failed. Russian special forces and local 
criminals called “separatists” proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic 
and Luhansk People’s Republic officially aiming at the secession 
from Ukraine and the creation of Novorossiya. In fact the entire 
project was drafted as a tool to destabilize and then to dominate 
Ukraine winning it back to the post-Soviet zone of an autocratic 
or semi-autocratic, oligarchic system. The possible success of the 
Ukrainian democratization process started with Maidan, and the 
consequent economic development based on the deep and compre-
hensive free trade zone with the EU established in the EU-Ukraine 
association agreement, was the Kremlin’s nightmare. The success 
of Ukrainian reforms based on democratization and a profit-seeking 
economy18 would be a fundamental challenge for the stability of 
Russian political system. The so called “sovereign democracy” as 
Putin’s propagandists have labelled the authoritarian system build 
in Russia after 1999, would be undermined. If Ukrainians “are Rus-
sians” and if democracy without adjectives are built by them, and 
bring with it an increase of living standards, the thesis that such 
a system does not fit real Russians would be questioned. Whether 
Putin believes in a great Russian ideology or just cynically plays 
with it is of a secondary importance. His aim is to maintain his 
power and a hypothetical Ukrainian success – quite possible one 
18 The Russian one is rightfully characterized as a rent seeking one which is 
the truth for all the post-Soviet area except for the Baltic States and Georgia – the 
latest since the rose revolution of 2003.
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could undermine it. This is why Ukraine (like Georgia before) was 
attacked and must be turned back into the post-Soviet zone. Putin 
lost the opportunity to close the game as a winner after Crimea had 
been taken. The successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Donbas 
threatened both the self-proclaimed “People’s Republics” with an-
nihilation and this was something Moscow could not afford to. The 
result is known – an open (however a limited one and never offi-
cially declared) invasion of Russian regular forces on Donbas that 
stopped Ukrainian advances and threatened Kyiv with the further 
lost of territories. The possible Russian plan is to establish the ter-
ritorial link to Crimea and Transdnistria thus completely cutting 
Ukraine off from the sea. This, however, means a full scale war. 
Still the nature of the game is not that simple. Russia has 
armed itself intensively since 2006. Since February 2013, the units 
of Russian Army have been activated by surprise and trained in 
a numerous manuevers the largest of which engaged 160,000 sol-
diers in 2013 (Wilk, 2013). It has not been done for fun. Great 
powers arm themselves quickly. A similar process took Hitler only 
six years (1933–1939). The wars won – Chechenia (1999–2005); 
Georgia (2008), and the conquest of Crimea – proved to the deci-
sion-makers in Kremlin that the use of military forces as a tool of 
foreign policy is effective. The policy that leads to success has a ten-
dency to be repeated. If Ukraine is abandoned by the West (which 
is possible) will nourish the Great Russian imperial mentality. The 
EU is not a structure built to deal with military threats and all the 
diplomatic actions taken in its name is negligible in that dimen-
sion. Russia does not respect the EU and despises it. The weak-
ness of NATO demonstrated at the Newport summit (4th–5th Septem-
ber 2014) where the alliance declared its respect for NATO-Russia 
Founding Act on Mutual Relations of 199719 declared its intention 
not to deploy permanent bases and serious military facilities in 
Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania and offered no real support 
for Ukraine, was a clear message sent to the Kremlin. The message 
is – “Go ahead and test our reaction.” The results are easily predict-
able and the conclusion is both simple and sad – the belle époque is 
over. The Guns of August and the appeasement of September reas-
sure us we will see the next Russian wars in Europe soon.
19 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO 
and the Russian Federation, signed in Paris, France, North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
sation, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm.
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